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Unit42 Threat Brief - Fighting Ursa

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This pack handles Unit42 Threat Brief - Fighting Ursa

Fighting Ursa Luring Targets With Car for Sale

A Russian threat actor we track as Fighting Ursa advertised a car for sale as a lure to distribute HeadLace backdoor malware. The campaign likely targeted diplomats and began as early as March 2024. Fighting Ursa (aka APT28, Fancy Bear and Sofacy) has been associated with Russian military intelligence and classified as an advanced persistent threat (APT).

Diplomatic-car-for-sale phishing lure themes have been used by Russian threat actors for years. These lures tend to resonate with diplomats and get targets to click on the malicious content.

Unit 42 has previously observed other threat groups using this tactic. For example, in 2023, a different Russian threat group, Cloaked Ursa, repurposed an advertisement for a BMW for sale to target diplomatic missions within Ukraine. This campaign is not directly connected to the Fighting Ursa campaign described here. However, the similarity in tactics points to known behaviors of Fighting Ursa. The Fighting Ursa group is known for repurposing successful tactics – even continuously exploiting known vulnerabilities for 20 months after their cover was already blown.

The details of the March 2024 campaign, which we attribute to Fighting Ursa with a medium to high level of confidence, indicate the group targeted diplomats and relied on public and free services to host various stages of the attack. This article examines the infection chain from the attack.

This pack will provide you with a first response kit which includes:

  • Collect, Extract and Enrich Indicators
  • Indicator Based Threat Hunting
  • Mitigations

Reference:

GRU’s BlueDelta Targets Key Networks in Europe with Multi-Phase Espionage Campaigns

ITG05 operations leverage Israel-Hamas conflict lures to deliver Headlace malware

TA422’s Dedicated Exploitation Loop—the Same Week After Week

Fighting Ursa Luring Targets With Car for Sale

A Russian threat actor we track as Fighting Ursa advertised a car for sale as a lure to distribute HeadLace backdoor malware. The campaign likely targeted diplomats and began as early as March 2024. Fighting Ursa (aka APT28, Fancy Bear and Sofacy) has been associated with Russian military intelligence and classified as an advanced persistent threat (APT).

Diplomatic-car-for-sale phishing lure themes have been used by Russian threat actors for years. These lures tend to resonate with diplomats and get targets to click on the malicious content.

Unit 42 has previously observed other threat groups using this tactic. For example, in 2023, a different Russian threat group, Cloaked Ursa, repurposed an advertisement for a BMW for sale to target diplomatic missions within Ukraine. This campaign is not directly connected to the Fighting Ursa campaign described here. However, the similarity in tactics points to known behaviors of Fighting Ursa. The Fighting Ursa group is known for repurposing successful tactics – even continuously exploiting known vulnerabilities for 20 months after their cover was already blown.

The details of the March 2024 campaign, which we attribute to Fighting Ursa with a medium to high level of confidence, indicate the group targeted diplomats and relied on public and free services to host various stages of the attack. This article examines the infection chain from the attack.

This pack will provide you with a first response kit which includes:

  • Collect, Extract and Enrich Indicators
  • Indicator Based Threat Hunting
  • Mitigations

Reference:

GRU’s BlueDelta Targets Key Networks in Europe with Multi-Phase Espionage Campaigns

ITG05 operations leverage Israel-Hamas conflict lures to deliver Headlace malware

TA422’s Dedicated Exploitation Loop—the Same Week After Week

PUBLISHER

PLATFORMS

Cortex XSOARCortex XSIAM

INFO

CertificationRead more
Supported ByCortex
CreatedAugust 2, 2024
Last ReleaseAugust 2, 2024

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